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Abstract
Homelessness and precarious living conditions are on the rise across much of
the Western world. This paper exploits exogenous variation in the affordability
of rents due to a cut that substantially lowered housing benefit – a welfare
benefit aimed at helping low income households pay rent. Before April 2011,
local housing allowance covered up to the median level of market rents; from
April 2011 onwards, only rents lower than the 30th percentile were covered.
We exploit that the extent of cuts significantly depend on statistical noise due
to estimation of percentiles. We document that the affordability shock caused
a significant increase in: evictions; individual bankruptcies; property crimes;
share of households living in insecure temporary accommodation; statutory
homelessness and actual rough sleeping. The fiscal savings of the cut are
much smaller than anticipated. We estimate that for every pound saved by
the central government, council spending to meet statutory obligations for
homelessness prevention increases by 53 pence. We further document political
effects: the housing benefit cut causes lower electoral registration rates and is
associated with lower turnout and higher support for Leave in the 2016 EU
referendum, most likely driven by its unequal impact on the composition of
those that engage with democratic processes.
Keywords: housing markets, welfare cuts, austerity, voting
JEL Classification: H2, H3, H5, P16, D72
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1 Introduction
In the past decades, housing markets in much of the Western world have seen
dramatic swings, often bringing about drastic changes to the lives of millions and
to urban landscapes alike. For example, the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 led
to close to one million evictions in the following year in the United States.1 More
recently, increasing property prices, making them unaffordable for the many, also
implied substantial reallocations in space in places like London and San Fran-
cisco. These structural shifts in housing markets arguably coerced families into
the duress of insecure living conditions. And, yet, those are known to have im-
pacts on the long-run economic outcomes of the families: it has pervasive effects
on the achievement of the children (Chyn, 2018), it is the harbinger of poor health
(Johnson and Johnson, 2011; Fowler et al., 2015), and increases the chances of being
laid off from work (Desmond and Gershenson, 2016).
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of an austerity policy in the
United Kingdom that attempted to reduce the fiscal cost of providing housing as-
sistance to low income households. The reform was implemented in March 2011,
and affected between .7 to 1 million households in the private rented sector (be-
tween 3-4 per cent of all households or between 17.5-25 per cent of all households
renting in the private sector). We explore quasi-exogenous variation in the extent
of the cuts to housing benefits that is due to how the value of housing benefits is
computed. From April 2011 onwards, the reference rates were cut to cover up to
the median level of rents in local rental markets to only cover up to the 30th per-
centile of rents, along the the distribution of rents in a given area, and for a given
dwelling type. The average exposure to the cut amounted to an annual housing
benefit reduction equivalent to a £470, rising to as much as nearly £2,400 in many
parts of London.
We explore intended and unintended shocks stemming from the policy imple-
mentation. The reference rents are empirically estimated by the Valuation Office
Agency on the basis of a sample of rents submitted voluntarily by the landlords
and real estate agencies. Thus, naturally, the 50th and 30th percentiles are noisy
1See https://evictionlab.org/national-estimates/
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empirical estimates of the corresponding quantities along the true underlying dis-
tribution of rents. This creates the prospect that in some places the policy shock
was stronger than in others, simply due to different random draws of the effec-
tive benefit cut which is driven by the difference between the 50th and 30th rent
percentiles.
While in our main specifications we explore the spatial decomposition of the
reference rents to identify the causal effects of the policy, we also leverage on the
randomness of the the empirical estimates of the quantiles for robustness. To do
so, we parse the explainable policy shock through an exercise whereby we attempt
to predict the shift from the 50th to 30th percentile in the period in which the
policy was implemented, using data from all time periods leading to that point.
We show that, in most cases, the predicted policy component accounts for roughly
half of the policy variation.
Overall, we show that the policy had substantial negative consequences. First,
in the following years it led to an increase in 22.1 per cent on forced evictions
and repossession orders in the private housing sector. This was accompanied by a
rise in individual insolvency and bankruptcies, which increased by about 2.6 and
3.7 per cent. We next trace what happened to the displaced households. We find
that the demand temporary housing offered by the councils increased by 17.8 per
cent as a consequence of the reduction in reference rents, with substantial cost
increase by 94 per cent at that local administrative level. What is more, statutory
homelessness and rough sleeping substantially increased in the years following
the reform, by 13.2 and 36.7 per cent, respectively. It is essentially a foreseeable
sequence of events: the reduction of the benefit had a material effect on the benefit
claimants, some of whom went to arrears and were forcefully displaced from their
homes, and setting the scene for unstable and insecure living conditions for many
affected by the policy.
Importantly, we show that the policy was close to neutral from the fiscal stand-
point. The direct fiscal savings to the central government for lower housing benefit
payments were substantially offset by an increase in the demand for temporary ac-
commodation. Local authorities and councils have a legal responsibility to prevent
homelessness and offer housing to qualifying households. We estimate that, on av-
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erage, for each pound of implied fiscal savings accruing to the central government
due to the cuts, local government expenditures on homeless prevention increased
by 53 pence. The distribution is substantially skewed: at the median council, while
the fiscal savings amounted to £12.92 per 1000 households, it is offset by increases
in homelessness prevention measures by councils of around £9.86 per 1000 house-
holds per district, resulting in a slim cost-saving of just £3.06 per 1000 households.
Yet, it also implied substantial reallocation of resources, since the savings were
accrued by the central government, and the costs are mostly borne by the local
councils. Taken together, this evidence suggest that policy substantially reduced
the welfare of the benefit claimants, with little-to-none implied fiscal savings.
Lastly we also document that the cut likely eroded the state of democracy and
democratic participation in the UK. Using annual data on electoral registration,
we observe that electoral registration rates significantly and more substantially
decreased in districts more affected, across both the parliamentary and the local
electorates. Studying the 2016 EU referendum vote, we further document that the
official 2016 EU referendum electorate as a share of the 2016 voting age popula-
tion, was significantly lower in districts more affected by the cut. Similarly, turnout
is drastically lower. Lastly, we also observe that a one standard deviation higher
level of exposure to the cut in a district is associated with an between 1-3 per-
centage point higher level of support for Leave. This effect is likely driven by the
composition of the electorate as studies since the 2016 EU referendum highlight
that support for Remain among those that did not turn out in the 2016 EU refer-
endum outnumbers support for Leave by 2:1. This highlights an indirect impact
that welfare cuts can have on democratic participation of particularly vulnerable
demographic groups, which may give rise to policies that further undermine the
welfare of those demographic and social groups.
This paper relates to three strands of the literature. First, it relates to the grow-
ing literature on the effects of insecure housing and homelessness, and showcases
how the interaction between public policies and private rental markets play a piv-
otal role in the provision of housing. Using data on foreclosures in the United
States stemming from the Great Depression in the late 2000s, Humphries et al.
(2019) show that eviction affects the consumption of durable goods years after
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eviction. Johnson and Johnson (2011) and Fowler et al. (2015) highlight the conse-
quences on health. The former argues that housing instability led to increases in
levels of depression, anxiety, and poorer health more generally; the latter shows an
increase in the number of suicides following forced evictions. The effect of a large
public housing spending in the Netherlands is analysed by Van Dijk (2019), point-
ing to negative labour market outcomes after moving into public housing. Chyn
(2018) uses the opposite variation – public housing demolition in Chicago, and
consequentially low-income households relocated into less-disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods – and shows that moving to better areas during childhood increases
employability in young adulthood.2 In contrast, our paper shows that a public
policy intended to generate fiscal savings forced the displacement of households
and created conditions under which insecure living conditions arose, ultimately
with little savings to the public treasury.
This paper also relates to the growing literature on the role of the welfare state
in the provision of housing amenities, and political and social preferences. In the
context of significantly rising property prices, the issue of affordability of rent be-
comes increasingly a social policy challenge.3 Ansell (2014) argues that homeown-
ers who experience house price appreciation become less supportive of redistribu-
tive and social insurance policies; this argument is expanded by Ansell (2019) who
suggests that welfare state policies and property ownership are, in some sense,
substitutes.4 It is thus possible that declining shares of homeownership in the UK
2Desmond (2012) mentions that “in poor black neighbourhoods, eviction is to woman what
incarceration is to men: a typical but severely consequential occurrence contributing to the repro-
duction of urban poverty.” See Desmond and Shollenberger (2015), Desmond and Kimbro (2015),
Desmond and Gershenson (2016) and Humphries et al. (2019) for economic effects of displacement
on neighbourhood inequality, maternal health, labour market outcomes, financial distress, residen-
tial mobility and neighbourhood quality. Other papers discussed the causes of eviction. Desmond
et al. (2013) shows that neighbourhoods with a percentage of children experience evictions more
often. Desmond and Gershenson (2017) applies a hazard model and identifies that family size,
job loss and neighbourhood crime levels are predictive of eviction. Diamond et al. (2019) shows
the rent control in San Francisco prevented eviction in the short term, but on the loss of housing
supply in the long run undermined the effects of this policy; Phinney et al. (2007) suggests that
drug use, mental and health problems are associated with homelessness.
3See Ansell et al. (2018) for a discussion on about the global imbalances of surplus channeled
to the real estate markets of deficit countries. Also see Verner and Gyongyosi (2018) for the link
betweeen the 2008 recession in Hungary and household finances.
4See also Kingston et al. (1984) and Gilderbloom and Markham (1995) for earlier works on the
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is associated with increasing social proclivity of housing benefit expenditures over
time prior to the implementation of the policy.5
Finally, we also contribute to work on Brexit. While much of the discourse is
still driven by mostly descriptive and cross-sectional studies, a growing body of
work explores the dynamics in the run up to the 2016 EU referendum. Specifically,
Fetzer (2019) focuses on the impact of a set of welfare cuts on political preferences
and, in particular, protest voting. The paper uses detailed micro data, that however,
has a significant problem with sample attrition, especially among private-rented
sector tenants, the object of this papers study. The relationship between populism
and spatial sorting has been explored in related work in Adler and Ansell (2020).6
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the context and our
data sources. 3 outlines our empirical strategy, followed by the results in Section
4. We present our back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis in Section 5. Section
6 concludes.
2 Context and data
2.1 Housing in the UK
The UK’s real estate market is fragmented into three main sectors: the private-
rented sector, the social-rented sector and owner occupation. Appendix Figure
A2 highlights the evolution of the three sectors over time since 2007 using data
from the Office of National Statistics. The private rented sector has significantly
expanded: in 2007, only 13% of households lived in the private rented sector. The
share has since expanded to cover 20% of households by 2017. The social-rented
sector has stayed fairly constant covering around 18% of households. On the other
hand, owner occupation has declined from around 68% of households in 2007 to
connection between homeownership and voter preferences. Scheve and Stasavage (2017) reviews
more generally how wealth may shape preferences towards redistributive policies.
5In the context of the United States, Mian et al. (2010) shows that subprime mortgage lenders
and borrowers influenced government policy toward housing finance. See also Mian et al. (2014),
Mian et al. (2012) and Gyongyosi and Verner (2018) for the effect of debtor distress during a finan-
cial crisis on support for the populist far right.
6For other papers that connect the provision of urban amenities to voting behaviour at the local
level, see Ahlfeldt (2011), Ahlfeldt and Kavetsos (2014), Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2015), Enos (2016) .
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only cover 62% of households in 2017. The decline within this category is driven
by a worsening access to home ownership: while the share of outright owners has
increased from 31% of households in 2007 to 34% in 2017, the share of homebuyers
has drastically declined from 37% in 2007 to 28% in 2017.
A predominant issue in the UK is a lack of housing supply and steadily eroding
affordability. Home prices have accelerated at faster rates compared to incomes,
resulting in a worsening affordability despite record low interest rates and various
schemes to boost demand. This dynamic is pushing more households into the
private rented sector. The increase in demand, with an overall inelastic housing
supply, is increasing the cost of renting. In England, the median household spends
more than 33% of their net disposable income on housing. In the lower tercile,
this share increases to 41% across England; in the lowest income decile, English
households spend 64% of their disposable income on housing.
Housing benefit, described in more detail in the next section, aims to relax
household budgets. Appendix Figure A3 displays the impact that housing benefit
across the three market segments. For home owners or mortgage owners, housing
benefit is not impacting the affordability. This group of households spends around
18.2% of their household disposable income on housing. In the private rented
sector, households spend, on average, 39% of their disposable income on housing
costs prior to housing benefit. Housing benefit is reducing the cost to 35%. In
the social rented sector, the housing cost burden is lower to begin with at around
35.7% of disposable income; housing benefit there lowers the cost of housing to
around 27.1%. This highlights that tenants in the social rented sector and the
private rented sector benefit differentially from housing benefit. Further, the two
benefit systems are not integrated: not only is housing in the social rented sector
cheaper, also the value of housing benefit is significantly higher.
In this paper, we focus on a reform that cut housing benefit in the private rented
sector (but not the social rented sector). We next describe how housing benefit is
computed and discuss the reform we study in this paper.
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2.2 Local Housing Allowance
Housing Benefit is a means tested social security benefit in the United King-
dom that is intended to help meet housing costs for rented accommodation.7 It is
the second biggest item in the Department for Work and Pensions’ budget after
the state pension. In 2016-17 housing benefit cost around £23 billion, 11 per cent
of total welfare spending and 1.2 per cent of GDP. From April 2008, a new policy
for calculating Housing Benefit for private rented sector tenants (and not those
in council or social housing) was introduced nationally, called the Local Housing
Allowance (LHA). LHA introduced a method of calculating housing benefit based
on the composition of the household and the median rent in a local Broad Mar-
ket Rental Area (BMRA). The LHA is a flat rate allowance for different types of
properties within a BMRA.8
Prior to April 2011, within a BMRA the LHA for different sizes of properties
was calculated with reference to an estimate of a rental market’s median rent.
To estimate the median market rent, VOA Rent Officers rely on data submitted
by private sector landlords and, in particular, letting agencies. While we do not
have access to the full micro data, the VOA uses around half a million data points
provided voluntarily to estimate the reference rents for each of the 152 BRMA’s
and across five main property size categories across England.9 This data is used
to estimate the BRMA and property-type specific median rent, defining an area’s
and property type’s Local Housing Allowance. Up until March 2012, the refer-
ence rents and medians were computed every month, implying that each year,
9,120 empirical estimates of quantiles were estimated off just 500,000 genuine data
points. From April 2012 onwards, the reference rents were only computed once a
7Similar schemes to support rent payments for low income households exist across many OECD
countries and are quite common.
8The main types are a single room in shared accommodation, a 1, 2 or 3 bedroom flat. Ap-
pendix Figure A1 provides the BRMA’s as per present. The BRMA’s do not map into any existing
administrative boundaries but broadly compromise areas of residential accommodation, within
which a person could reasonably be expected to live thereby having access to facilities and services
for the purposes of health, education, recreation, personal banking and shopping. When determin-
ing BMRAs the Rent Officer takes account of the distance of travel, by public and private transport,
to and from those facilities and services.
9Scotland and Wales have independent rent-officers that collate similar data to estimate per-
centiles for the 18 BRMA’s in Scotland and the 22 BRMA’s in Wales.
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year using data points from the previous calendar year.
Cut to Local Housing Allowance The reform we exploit in this paper is a change
in the reference rent that is covered. Up until April 2011, the reference rent that
defined the LHA for a property class was the median of the empirical distribution of
rents within a BRMA. From April 2011 onwards, this reference rent was shifted to
be the 30th percentile, rather than the median. Naturally, this implied that many
housing benefit recipients will have experienced a significant cut to their financial
support to pay for rent.
Individual reform timing The cut of housing benefit was rolled out to existing
housing benefit claimants between April 2011 and December 2012. The dates at
which a particular claimant becomes treated is linked to the date of their last claim
reassessment or claim anniversary in the year prior to April 2011 (or the date on
which the claim began, if it began in the year prior to April 2011 and there had
been no reassessment since). By default, LHA awards are updated at least once
a year, implying that the stock of existing claimants will have been affected by
December 2012 the latest.10
We next describe how we measure exposure to the cut at the district level.
2.3 Official impact estimates
The responsible Department for Works and Pension has conducted, in late 2010,
an Economic Impact Assessment of the proposed reform. For that purpose, the
DWP constructed, using the detailed and confidential individual-level claimant
count database the two main ingredients to compute the ex-ante expected impact
of the cut: the claimant count Cd,c,t, which captures the number of claimants living
in district d and property type c at time t that would be affected by the housing
benefit cut. And, second, the respective individual level losses, which ultimately
are due to the difference in LHA rates between the 30th or 50th percentile relative
to the individual level rent. Overall, it was estimated that 774,970 households
10Individuals may be affected earlier if there was other changes to their eligibility, such as the
number of bedroom entitlement due to a change in household composition etc.
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would lose a part of their housing benefit – among a total case-load of 939,220
individual cases.
From the official impact assessment, we extracted both the baseline number of
claimants that would be affected by the cut, Cd,c,baseline, along with the average loss
per claimant Ld,c,t. The latter, ultimately, is directly a function of the estimated
difference in the median versus 30th percentile rent. In Figure 1, we present the
variation in the measure Ld,c,t that this implied across the UK for three different
types of properties: one-bedroom flats, two-bedroom flats and three bedroom flats.
These types of properties make up the vast majority of housing benefit claims.
The map highlights the spatial distribution in the amount per week that benefit
claimants, on average, lost due to the change in the reference rents. In the top
quintile, the loss per affected household consistently amounts to at least £500 per
year, but is usually notably higher. In Camden, the average loss per household in a
two bedroom property amounted to £1,924 per year. Given that median household
disposable income across the UK in 2010 stood at £24,400, this implies a near
8% cut in benefit income. The map highlights that there is significant variation
across the UK in the intensity of the cut across different property types. While
London clearly stands out as being among the worst affected parts, there is clear
and distinct and extensive variation across the UK.11
Figure 2 provides the spatial distribution of the share of households living in
one of the UK’s 380 local authority districts in the left Panel A. This highlights that
the baseline distribution of benefit claimants that would be affected by the cut is far
from homogenous across the UK. Rather, it suggest that the share of households
affected appears distinctly high in Central London, but less so in the commuting
areas around London. Further hotspots appear to be along the UK’s coastal towns
and the North East and North West. Panel B provides the total financial loss per
affected households from the official impact estimates. This underscores again that
the losses are quite heterogenous across the UK; financially, the cuts appear to be
most severe in Greater London and around Oxford.
For a significant part of the analysis, we leverage the official impact estimates
provided by the Department of Works and Pension. In the empirical strategy
11Our results are robust to dropping London throughout.
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section we also develop another estimation strategy that ultimately decomposes
the treatment intensity into a predictable and an unpredictable part. We next
describe the main outcome data.
2.4 Measuring precarious living conditions and homelessness
We draw on a host of official data sources to shed a comprehensive light on the
economic and social impact of the housing benefit cut shock.
Forced evictions and repossessions We use annual data on eviction and repos-
session procedures covering England and Wales from 2008 onwards. The data was
obtained from the Ministry of Justice and is broken down by local authority. We
focus on repossessions of properties by landlords. The data allow us to distinguish
between evictions and repossessions at the various stages of the underlying legal
proceedings with the responsible County Court. Further, we can distinguish be-
tween evictions and possession orders pertaining to individuals living in private
rented accommodation (and hence possibly affected by the housing benefit cut) or
those living in the social rented sector (which was unaffected by the housing ben-
efit cuts, which we will later use as a placebo); similarly, we also observe evictions
and repossession actions following mortgage default. This provides us with some
placebo outcomes.
Individual insolvencies We further leverage annual data from the UK’s Insol-
vency Service. This data provides us with the number of new individual insolvency
cases. This data is available at the district level from 2008 to 2016. Rent arrears are
the most common reason for evictions of tenants in the private rented sector, but
they usually exacerbate already distressful financial situations. Individual insol-
vencies are a further outcome measure to measure financial distress, which may
be exacerbated by the steep rise in the cost of renting that the housing benefit cut
implied.
Temporary Housing & Statutory Homelessness We leverage data from the Min-
istry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) measuring the
11
share of households in a local authority that is living in temporary accommo-
dation. Local housing authorities in England have a duty to secure accommo-
dation for unintentionally homeless households in priority need under Part 7 of
the Housing Act 1996 (as amended). Households might be placed in temporary
accommodation pending the completion of inquiries into an application, or they
might spend time waiting in temporary accommodation after an application is
accepted until suitable secure accommodation becomes available. As such, being
housed in temporary accommodation is a primary and first indicator capturing
the distinct risk of homelessness.
The statutory homelessness count refers to the number of households over the
course of a year which the local authority has agreed it has a duty to house under
the 1996 Housing Act. Homeless households can apply to their local authority for
housing assistance. Households are accepted if they are eligible, unintentionally
homeless, and in a priority need group. Priority need groups include households
with dependent children, pregnant women and vulnerable individuals. MHCLG
provides annual statutory homelessness statistics which consists of the total house-
holds which the local authorities deem to be homeless. We also have data on the
various components of the total which comprises of the number of households
who are accepted as being homeless and require/not require priority need, house-
holds which are eligible but not homeless, households which are eligible and in
priority need but intentionally homeless. All these statistics are based on decisions
made in each financial year (from April to March) and the data runs from April
2008 to March 2018. The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 came into force in Eng-
land on 1st April 2018. The Act puts a new duty on local authorities to prevent or
relieve homelessness for anyone eligible for public funds, not just those who are
unintentionally homeless and in priority need.
Local government expenditure data To study financial outcomes at the district
level, we further obtained data pertaining to Local Government Finances, which
separately lists the cost of homelessness prevention, administration and the as-
sociated cost of housing homeless households. We compute the cost associated
with homelessness prevention measures in the broadest sense at the level of the
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local government area and use this as a main outcome measure when studying the
cost- and benefits. Lastly, we also obtained data from the Department of Works
and Pension, that administers Housing Benefit. Specifically, we measure the total
amount of spending per household in a district, to explore the impact of the cut
on spending.
Rough sleeping street counts We also leverage data capturing street counts of
rough sleepers at the district level. This data is far from perfect as districts use
different methodologies and timings to conduct street counts. The data is available
from 2010 to 2018; some councils have conducted street counts already prior to
2010. Rough sleeping is defined as people sleeping, about to bed down or actually
bedded down in the open air or in buildings and other places not designed for
habitation. The definition does not include people in hostels or shelters, people
in campsites or other sites used for recreational purposes or organised protest,
squatters or travellers.
The numbers on rough sleepers is a result of street counts, evidence-based
estimates and estimates informed by a spotlight street count of rough sleeping
by local authorities. It is up to local authorities to decide whether to carry out a
rough sleeping count in the light of rough sleeping problems in their area. Where
local authorities have decided to count, a count is essentially a snapshot of the
number of rough sleepers in any given area on a particular night and it will not
therefore record everyone in the area with a history of rough sleeping. This is
usually done post midnight by volunteers in the local authorities’ own workforce
or from the local voluntary sector and formally take place between 1 October and
30 November. Given that rough sleepers often move between local authority areas
(particularly in urban areas) it is suggested that neighbouring authorities count on
the same night whenever possible. This eliminates double counting and ensures
that more mobile rough sleepers are not missed. If a local authority chooses not
to conduct a formal rough sleeper count, it should provide an annual estimate of
rough sleeping numbers to CLG each year, after consultation with local agencies
(e. g. outreach workers, police, faith groups, voluntary sector organisations, etc)
to help inform the national picture on rough sleeping.
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Democratic participation, registration and the 2016 EU referendum We further
obtained data on the electoral registration rates. In the UK, every resident indi-
vidual (with and without abode) is regularly reminded to register on the electoral
roll. Using data from the UK’s Electoral Commission we construct the share of the
electorate among the voting age population in a district that is registered. Techni-
cally, this share should be very close to one. One source of the discrepancy could
be due to migration as electorate statistics are produced based on the eligibility to
vote in respective elections. To allay some concerns about mis-measurement, we
study both the parliamentary as well as the local electorates. The former includes
all UK, EU and most Commonwealth nationals, while the latter only includes UK
and many Commonwealth nationals. Lastly, we also study the 2016 EU referen-
dum results and vote shares to document that housing benefit cuts appear to have
had an impact on the 2016 EU referendum vote, in particular, through its impact
on turnout and the electorate.
Auxiliary outcomes We further study a host of auxiliary outcomes. We gather
data for England and Wales on crime in the UK, specifically, we focus on property
crimes and thefts from person. As auxiliary outcomes, we further have collected
data from the Annual Population Survey on unemployment rates and inactivity
rates. These will highlight that our treatment measure are not confounding auxil-
iary effects or economic shocks to local labor markets.
We next discuss some qualitative evidence.
2.5 Qualitative evidence
The cut to housing benefit is said to have had a dramatic impact on the private
rented market. Specifically, due to the increase in arrears and evictions, many pri-
vate sector landlords flat out refuse to house or rent to housing benefit recipients.
In some cases, there is reports that indicate that some landlords, in response to the
cuts, terminated the common short-hold tenancies.
Representatives of private landlords, such as the Residential Landlords Asso-
ciation (RLA), suggest that ”the vast majority [of our members] are reluctant to
take benefit claimants, not just because of the benefit and welfare changes, but be-
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cause of higher management costs involved in managing benefit claimants.” The
RLA reported that arrears have increased since the introduction of the LHA. It
warned that, as LHA rates continue to lose value relative to private sector rents,
landlords will have less motivation to rent to benefit claimants or invest in the
affordable rental market and less incentive to keep homes properly repaired and
maintained. Since the cuts to LHA from 2011 onwards, is not uncommon for rental
advertisements to explicitly state “no children, no pets, no DSS [Department for
Social Security].” The exclusion of families with children is particularly common
as eviction procedures for families with children is more costly for landlords; the
reference to the Department of Social Security explicitly refers to exclusion of ten-
ants on benefits.
The National Landlords Association made a similar point:
“in the last three years there has been a 50% drop in the number of
landlords taking people who are on benefits. It is now down to only
one fifth; 22% of our landlord members whom we surveyed say they
have LHA tenants, and 52% of those surveyed said they would not look
at taking on benefits tenants.” (House of Commons, 2016)
Witnesses reported that the quality of PRS properties that remain available at
LHA rates was relatively poor. The charity of St Mungo stated that the majority
of housing available to housing benefit recipients was near the ”lower limit” of
minimal standards of accommodation. It was finding that, before placing people
in available properties, ”a lot of work has to be done around addressing issues
that have a big impact on health, around damp and other issues.” Homeless Link
reported that it was being compelled to place people in poor quality PRS properties
because there were no other available options.12
We next present the empirical strategy, followed by the results.
12See https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmworpen/720/72005.
htm
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3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Official Impact estimates
As described in the context section, we rely on the official impact estimates that
were constructed just prior to the reform becoming effective. The documentation
around the economic impact assessment provides us with both, the number of
claimants affected, Cd,c,baseline, as well as the average loss per claimant and property
type, Ld,c. The cross-sectional measure capturing the total predicted financial loss
in a district d, combining all property types c, can thus be computed as
Sofficiald = ∑
c
Ld,c × Cd,c,baseline.
Throughout, we normalize the shock by the (time-varying) population levels or by
the number of households living in an area.13
Empirically, we put specific emphasis on the expected loss per household Ld,c.
As indicated, this is directly a function of the difference between the median and
the 30th percentile. Given the high degrees of sampling variation to be expected,
this difference is likely estimated with significant noise. We next describe a frame-
work to construct alternative exposure measures.
3.2 Decomposing the identifying variation
As indicated, when determining the LHA, the Valuation Office Agency (VOA)
studies the empirical distribution of rents within the area under consideration.
The VOA estimates, for each district d, each property type c, at each point in time
t the percentiles of the private sector rents.14 We label those estimates for the p-th
quantile – either 30th or 50th – as τˆd,c,p,t. We fix this measure at March 2011, the
last month prior to the implementation of the cut. We thus write the financial loss
13Results are robust to using baseline population levels. Normalizing by the time-varying pop-
ulation figures is conservative as the UK has seen notable population growth.
14Formally, the statistics are constructed at the level of the Broad Rental Market Area. We map
these to the level of the district d using a cross-walk constructed on the ward-level housing benefit
spend data from 2010.
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to claimants with property type c in district d as
Ld,c = τˆd,c,50,baseline − τˆd,c,30,baseline
and the implied fiscal shock in district d can be represented as
Sofficiald = ∑
c
[τˆd,c,50,baseline − τˆd,c,30,baseline]× Cd,c,baseline. (1)
Naturally, the percentile of rents is an empirical estimate which is likely to
feature both signal about the underlying true distribution of rents as well as sta-
tistical noise. The statistical noise can occur to a variety of reasons. The most
direct are sampling errors due the estimation of over 2,400 moments of the distri-
bution of rents. Furthermore, the VOA computes the 30th and 50th quantiles on
the basis of the stock of rental agreements in a given period, and those underpin
the reference rents for the following period. Thus, the reference rents τˆb,c,50,baseline
and τˆb,c,30,baseline also embed what is essentially related to a forecasting error. We
compound the two sources of noise into an error term eb,c,p,baseline and write the
estimate of the p-th quantile as the combination of signal and noise:
τˆb,c,p,baseline = τb,c,p,baseline + eb,c,p,baseline.
In this expression, τˆb,c,p,baseline is the observed p-th quantile of the rent distribution
for on dwellings of type c, in rental area b, and applicable as reference rates at the
baseline. Moreover, τb,c,p,baseline is the p-th quantile of the true distribution of rents,
and eb,c,p,baseline is the unpredictable error in estimating this latter object.
As indicated above, in our main specifications use the shifts in the observed dis-
tribution on rents, as in Equation (1). However, this framework allows us to go
one step further and explore separately the predictable and unpredictable policy
shocks. More specifically, the predictable component arises from the shift from
the 50th to the 30th quantile along the true distribution of rents; this is essentially
the intended policy shock and is represented by τb,c,50,baseline − τb,c,30,baseline. The
unintended and unpredictable element stems from the forecasting error and the
statistical noise in estimating the quantiles themselves. Formally, we can decom-
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pose the fiscal savings in Equation (1) as:
Sofficiald = ∑
c
[τb,c,50 − τb,c,30]× Cd,c︸ ︷︷ ︸
intended shock ≡ Spredictedd
+∑
c
[eb,c,50 − eb,c,30]× Cd,c︸ ︷︷ ︸
unintended shock ≡ Sresiduald
where all measures are computed at the baseline (the ”baseline” subscript was
removed for conciseness). The first and second components are the predictable
and unpredictable components of the policy variation, respectively.
To parse out these two elements, we proceed as follows. For each period prior
to and including March 2011, we compute the observed interquantile difference
τˆb,c,50,t− τˆb,c,30,t. We can do so for the ten months from June 2010 to March 2011, as
we obtained data from the VOA for the those quantiles during this time window.
We then draw on the data up to February 2011 to predict the out-of-the-sample
interquantile difference for the next month (our baseline measure of the policy
shock). We associate the model forecast to the predictable policy shock τb,c,50 −
τb,c,30, from which we compute S
predicted
d after applying to the measure of affected
claimants Cd,c. The forecast error, or unexplained portion, gives rise to our measure
of eb,c,50 − eb,c,30, and thus Sresiduald . This allows us to decompose the overall policy
shock into intended and unintended components, the latter of which is driven by
statistical fluctuations in the estimates of the quantiles.
We use out-of-the-sample prediction as this is effectively the policy dynamics in
which the reference rentals are set in anticipation of the prices effective in the next
period. We use a number of models to forecast the difference between the 50th and
30th quantile in March 2011. More specifically, we introduce lagged dependent
variables, district fixed effects and linear trends, as well as the combination be-
tween these features. We ultimately select the final forecasting model based on the
out-of-the-sample forecasting performance, measured through the mean-squared
prediction error in the baseline month. Intuitively, this broad search for the best-
performing forecasting model ensures that most of the predictable variation in the
policy shock is being accounted for.15
15The mean-squared prediction error per dwelling type can be seen in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The model with local linear trends out-performs the competing models for 1, 2 and 3 bedrooms.
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In Figure 3, we plot the predicted and residualised shock measures relative to
the standard deviation of the official impact estimates. This highlights that there is
substantive variation in both the predictable- as well as the unpredictable compo-
nent. Strictly speaking, the former is exogenous by virtue of being predetermined,
while the latter is exogenous, by virtue of the variation mostly and likely capturing
sampling variation. In the empirical design where we exploit this decomposition,
we focus on both the projected- as well as the residualized treatment measure.
We next describe the main empirical specification we study.
3.3 Empirical specification
Throughout, we estimate variations of a difference-in-differences design.
Main difference-in-difference The main baseline specification takes the follow-
ing form:
yd,t = αd + γt + ∑
t 6=2010
ηt ×Yeart × Sjd + β′Xd,t + ei,t (2)
where yd,t denotes a district d level outcome, such as eviction rates, the share of
households living in temporary accommodation or deemed homeless. The district
level fixed effect αd absorbs any time-invariant differences, while the year fixed
effects γt remove common idiosyncratic trends.
The main coefficients of interest are the estimated coefficients ηt on the inter-
action between the various cross-sectional exposure measures Sjd before and after
the reform was implemented, for j ∈ {official, predicted, residual}. The above
specification estimates a separate coefficient for each year, allowing the results
to be presented visually in graphical form, providing evidence in support of the
underlying implicit common trends assumption. In the tables, we pool the post-
treatment coefficients into a single estimate. In some specifications, we also in-
clude a vector of additional controls. In particular, we interact a set of year fixed
effects with the baseline claimant distribution across different property types c per
capita, Cd,c,baseline. As such, this implies we flexibly control for trends that could
The policy shock for shared properties is best forecasted with autoregressive lags 1 and 6 and
BRMA fixed effects. Finally the policy shock is best predicted for 4-bedroom properties with a
model containing lag 6 and BRMA fixed effects.
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drive variation in the Sjd measure due to changes in demand for housing benefit that
may be independent from the change in the LHA rates. This puts further emphasis
on the fact that what we aim to causally identify in this paper is the impact of the
shock to affordability.
We present results including- and excluding London; similarly, we also present
results where the sample is restricted to include data up until 2013. From 2013
onwards, Fetzer (2019) highlights that numerous other welfare reforms were im-
plemented, which may be correlated with the treatment we study in this paper.
Exogenous treatment We also explore specifications where we replace Sofficiald ,
with the decomposed Sresiduald and S
predicted
d . In the table presentation, these exer-
cises are labelled as exogenous treatment. Econometrically speaking, the former is
exogenous by virtue of being predetermined leveraging only pre-treatment data.
The latter is exogenous by virtue of the residual variation most likely capturing
sampling variation in the empirical estimates of the quantiles. For the exercise
where we exploit variation in Sresiduald , we also flexibly control for non-linear time
trends in the across the quintiles of the Spredictedd component. This essentially im-
plies that we allow for non-linear time trends in the expected component of the
shock, further zooming in on the unexplained exogenous variation, much of which
is driven by noise in the empirical estimation of the quantiles.
Matching design As a further robustness check, we also implement a matching
design. We dummify the treatment for districts in the upper quartile of exposure
and then constructed matched pairs. We match on a vector of characteristics cap-
turing local housing markets and supply. Specifically, we match on: the levels as
well as changes in the shares of households living in owner occupied properties,
in the social rented sector and the private rented sector between the 2001 and 2011
census. Similarly, we match on the share of residents commuting to London for
work as of the 2011 census, the share of resident households on waiting lists for
social housing and the average rent levels in 2010. To focus again on the compo-
nent of the variation that is due to the losses entailed by the estimated difference in
quantiles, we also match on the official DWP impact estimates capturing the share
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of resident households affected by the reform, Cd,c,baseline. The result from the
matching design is a set of matched pairs. For each district in the upper treatment
quartile, we find a matched observation in the lower quartile that is similar on ob-
servables. We only retain matched pairs where the difference in propensity scores
is less than 0.2. We then re-estimate a similar specification as 2, with the difference
that we also add matched pair by year fixed effects, allowing for non-parametric
time trends in the propensity scores or the quality of the match.
Throughout the paper, standard errors are clustered at the district level (con-
stituency level for the Westminster election analysis). 16
4 Main Results
4.1 Housing benefit spending
As a first step, we document the impact of the change in reference rents on the
effective spending on housing benefits. Figure 4 indicates that the policy reduced
the actual spending between 1 and 3 per cent, and become especially pronounced
in 2012 and subsequent years. This is a feature of the sequential rollout of the
policy, as the reference rates for individual claimants are updated in their claim
anniversary. At latest, the stock of individuals would have updated the new refer-
ence rates at December 2012, and the period between March 2011 and December
2012 can be regarded as transitional periods.
4.2 Evictions
We begin by presenting the results on evictions. Visually, these are presented
in Figure 5, using the main and official district level impact estimate, Sofficiald , as
treatment variable. he independent treatment variable has been normalised to
have unit standard deviation. The figure suggests a sharp increase in eviction
action following the implementation of the cuts. Further, there is no evidence that
suggests significant pre-treatment trends.
The point estimates in Table 1 pool the individual estimates. The estimates in
Panel A indicate that 1 standard deviation in the exposure to the cut in LHA is
16Districts are the main meaningful subnational administrative unit in the UK. Results are robust
to computing spatial HAC errors or clustering at a higher level statistical areas.
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associated to an increase of .121 possession claims per one thousand inhabitants,
or a 22.1 per cent increase relative to the mean of the dependent variable. Results
are robust but notably higher in London, which is not surprising. The impact
on actual repossessions carried out by county court bailiffs, in Panel B, in relative
terms suggests a 19.8 per cent increase due to the drop in LHA. Again, the effect
is stronger in London, which, however, also sees a higher level of evictions and
repossessions to begin with.
Panel C and Panel D can be seen as a form of placebo test. The cut to LHA did
not affect the social-rented sector, but only the private rented sector. There is no
discernible impact on eviction actions issued to the social rented sector; the impact
is fully carried by eviction and repossession actions, usually due to rent arrears,
concentrated in the private rented sector in which housing benefit claimants were
directly impacted by the cut to LHA.
4.3 Individual Insolvencies
We begin by presenting the results on individual bankruptcies. Typically, mort-
gage and rent arrears can not be included in common insolvency routines as they
are classified as priority debt to be recovered via the court proceedings around
evictions. Nevertheless, the data provide a window into financial grievances that
households may face. Anecdotally, many households have accommodated the
losses to their housing benefit by drawing down savings or by starting to finance
consumption through consumer loans, while still paying rent. Hence it is not in-
conceivable that some households and individuals started to accumulate problem-
atic consumer debt that subsequently needed to be restructured. There is evidence
that this is indeed the case. In Figure 6, we again focus on the main and official
district level impact estimate, Sofficiald , as treatment variable. The figure suggests
a sharp increase in overall new individual bankruptcy cases as well as a notable
increase in individual voluntary agreements as a debt restructuring method. No-
tably, the latter appears to have been on a declining trend relative to 2010, making
a sharp turn and dramatically increasing in districts more affected by the cut to
LHA.
The point estimates in Table 2 pool the individual post-treatment estimates.
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The point estimate in column (1) in Panel A suggests that a 1 standard deviation
increase in the exposure to the cut in LHA, is associated with 2.58 per cent increase
in total new individual bankruptcies cases. The results are fairly stable across
specifications and are precisely estimated. Panel B finds slightly higher effect sizes
on individual voluntary arrangements – an insolvency procedure that is typically
used to restructure consumer loans – indicating a treatment effect of around 3.7
per cent for a district with a 1 standard deviation higher exposure.17
4.4 Temporary accommodation and council homelessness spend-
ing
As indicated, councils have a legal obligation to provide housing for house-
holds that are deemed priority – typically families with children, pregnant, or sick
and disabled households – and at risk of homelessness. Councils bear the cost
of providing this temporary accommodation. In Figure 7 we present evidence on
the demand for temporary accommodation by councils in Panel A, along with
the councils’ spending on hosting homeless in hostels and bread-and-breakfast
accommodations. Both figures have skyrocketed dramatically from 2011 onwards.
In Table 3 we present the corresponding impact estimates. Using the official
treatment estimates, in Column (1) we find that the demand for temporary accom-
modation grew by 17.8 per cent as a consequence of the reduction in reference
rents, although the results are driven mostly by the London metropolitan area, the
point estimates excluding London are nevertheless positive and just at the border
of being statistically significant. What is more, we find that the council spending
on temporary housing increased sharply by around 94 per cent as a consequence
of the policy. This is possibly explained by the relative high costs of harbouring in-
dividuals in temporary housing, as opposed to more permanent arrangements.
Panel B focuses on council spending on overnight temporary accommodation,
such as hostels and bed and breakfasts; Panel C includes more broadly, spending
on temporary housing. As a result of the increase in demand for temporary ac-
commodation due to the sharp rise in evictions, many councils had to dramatically
17Rent arrears can be included under the insolvency procedures but require the permission of
the landlord, who typically prefer to use court action.
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expand their homeless prevention spending, often, this involved renting properties
from the private-rented sector at market rates, ultimately, eliminating much of the
fiscal savings that were projected to be generated by decoupling housing benefit
cost from local rental markets.
In Section 5 we compare the cost savings from the reduction of reference rents
with the increase in spending in temporary housing; we find that approximately 53
per cent of the savings were offset by these measures undertaken by at the councils
level. Given the relative lack of independence for councils to raise revenues or issue
debt, for example, for home construction, this naturally had further implications
for public service provision at the local level, as many councils simply had to
finance this extra cost by cutting spending elsewhere.
4.5 Statutory homelessness and rough sleeping
We next turn our attention to the effects of the reduction of reference rents
on homelessness. Households are considered to “statutory homeless” if the local
authorities consider that they do not have a right to occupy a property, or are at
imminent risk of becoming homeless according to the 1996 Housing Act 1996, 2002
Homelessness Act, and 2017 Homelessness Reduction Act. The several housing
acts also specify eligibility status, which in broad terms refer to immigration status
and exclude intentional homelessness. Satisfying those criteria, the councils have a
statutory responsibility to provide for housing and services, free of charge. Rough
sleeping is defined as sleeping, or bedded down, in open air or in buildings or
other places not designed for habitation. For this later outcome, as explained
in Section 2.4, we rely on rough sleeping street counts carried by the councils
themselves.
In Figure 8 we show evidence of a strong increase in both statutory homeless
and rough sleeping in the years following the reform. Statutory homelessness
was effectively trending downwards up to 2010, and the trend reverts in the post-
reform years. Pre-trends are largely absent from rough sleeping impact estimates.
Table 4 presents the point estimates for the full post-reform effects. It indicates
a 13.2 per cent increase in statutory homelessness, a result that is robust to the ex-
clusion of the London metropolitan area. Furthermore, suggests that the reduction
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in the reference rents increased rough sleeping by a substantial 36.7 per cent in the
post-2011 years; the numbers are slightly lower and still statistically significant by
excluding London from the sample.
4.6 Electoral registration and EU referendum vote
Lastly, we also study the impact on democratic participation and the 2016 EU
referendum.
Electoral registration We first study the impact on the electoral registration rates
using two measures of the electoral registration coverage. The first studies the
parliamentary electors, which includes all UK nationals resident in the UK, most
Commonwealth citizens legally resident in the UK as well as Irish nationals. The
second data considers local government electors. This set is a superset of the
parliamentary electors, by also including all European nationals that are legally
resident in the UK. Individuals in the UK need to register to vote and councils
regularly update electoral rolls. Yet, it is known that coverage is particularly low
among individuals living in less stable temporary or private rented accommoda-
tion.
We construct a measure of the electoral registration rates measuring the share
of the respective electorates as a share of the voting age population. The latter data
is provided by the Office of National Statistics and is updated annually. Visually,
the results are presented in Figure 9. Panel A focuses on the electoral registration
coverage of parliamentary electors, while Panel B focuses on local electors. There is
a notable increase in 2010, which coincides with a parliamentary election year and
with the first year for which elections were held on the new set of constituency
boundaries. This typically triggers special registration effort. Relative to 2010,
there is a steady and increasingly sharp drop in the electoral registration coverage
rate both for parliamentary and local electors across the UK, concentrated in areas
most exposed to the housing benefit cut.
Appendix Table A4 provides the corresponding point estimates. The results
suggest that a 1SD higher exposure to the housing benefit cut is associated with a
reduction in 0.3% lower electoral registration rates. This may seem small, but in
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relation to the average electoral coverage gap of just 7 percent, this is not negligible.
2016 EU referendum In Table 5 , we present results pertaining to the 2016 EU
referendum vote. The official counting areas for the 2016 EU referendum were
local authority districts, the unit of analysis for this study.
We estimate the following cross-sectional regression
yd = αr(d) + γ
′Sjd + ξ
′Xd + ed
where yd measures three different outcomes: the official electorate that was eli-
gible to vote by virtue of being registered in the 2016 EU referendum as a share of a
districts voting age population; the actual turnout, measured as the share of votes
cast as a proportion of the electorate; the vote share for Leave. The regression fur-
ther includes region controls αr(d), in particular, a set shifters capturing geographic
heterogeneity across the 39 different NUTS2 level regions across England, Scotland
and Wales (Northern Ireland is dropped). Similarly, we also include a set of dis-
trict controls Xd taken from Becker et al. (2017) measuring both the levels as well
as changes in immigration between 2001 and 2011 stemming from EU countries
that were members of the EU already 2001; accession countries that joined the EU
in 2004; and the rest of the world.
The result in Table 5 follow a similar layout as the previous exercises. The re-
sults in Panel A confirm our previous results suggesting that electoral registration
rates appear distinctly lower. On average, a 1SD higher exposure to the housing
benefit cut is associated with a near 1 percentage point lower electoral registration
coverage rate for the 2016 EU referendum electorate. Panel B further and in addi-
tion highlights, that turnout also appears distinctly lower. A 1 SD higher exposure
to the housing benefit cut is associated with a 1.8 percentage point lower turnout
in the 2016 EU referendum. Lastly, Panel C highlights that the changes in the
composition of the electorate or turnout, may have affected the EU referendum re-
sult at the district level. Support for Leave appears between 1-3 percentage points
higher across all specifications. Part of this effect may be driven by systematically
lower turnout and electoral participation that may, on average, have higher sup-
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port for Remain. This is confirmed in analysis of opinion polling conducted after
the 2016 EU referendum: support for Remain among the group of non-voters in
2016 outnumbers support for Leave by around 2:1 (see Alabrese and Fetzer, 2018).
While we do not want to interpret the effects causally, they do suggest that sys-
tematically lower levels of turnout, in particular in urban agglomerations, where
the impact of housing benefit cuts were particularly severely felt, may have under-
mined support for Remain in the 2016 EU referendum, likely affecting the aggre-
gate result.
4.7 Auxiliary results, robustness and null effects
Column (4) of Tables 1 implements the specification where we introduce year
interacted with the distribution of claimants across property types. This controls
for changes in the composition of the demands for the benefits. In all cases, we
observe that the point estimates are either relatively unchanged or increase as
compared to the baseline specifications in Columns (1) to (3). In Columns (5) and
(6) we repeated the impact assessment exercise with the exogenous component of
policy shock, i.e., the intended and unintended parts of the policy variation that are
driven by the projected and the noise in the empirical estimates of the quantiles,
Spredictedd and S
residual
d respectively. In most cases, we replicate the main policy
effects obtained through the official policy variation Sofficiald . Finally, in Column (6)
we present the results of the matching estimator, which in further corroborate the
main findings.
We finish this section by presenting some notable null-results that can help
ruling out alternative mechanisms.
No impact on unemployment or economic activity In particular, an area’s expo-
sure to the cut is not associated with a change in local unemployment nor a change
in the economic activity rate, suggesting that the shock is not confounding other
structural changes to local labor markets.
Temporary increase in property crimes In Appendix Figure A5 we present re-
sults pertaining to crime data for England and Wales. These data suggest that,
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in particular property crimes saw a sharp increase in 2011/2012 in locations more
severely affected by the housing benefit cut, relative to the pre-treatment period.
This sharp increase was of temporary nature however. In Appendix Table A3 we
present the corresponding point estimates which suggest a persistent and large
positive impact on thefts from persons.
5 Cost-benefit comparison
As indicated, the net fiscal savings that the cut to housing benefit spending
brought about, may be mostly or partially be offset with increased cost to local
councils for housing households that satisfy the legal definition of being threat-
ened by unintentional homelessness and are deemed a priority need.
We can conduct a cost-benefit computation, ignoring the associated indirect
human and economic costs that are associated with evictions. To do so, we com-
pute the full distribution of treatment effects that are implied by the results in
Table A2, along with the impacts documented on increased cost to councils to pay
for temporary accommodation to homeless households (along with the associated
administrative cost), that we documented in Table 3.
Rationale Since many councils were forced to sell a significant share of their
housing stock at below-market prices to tenants under the UK’s system of Right
to Buy scheme introduced by Margaret Thatchers Conservative government in
the 1980s, many councils do not have vacancies in their retained social housing
stock. As a result, they need to resort to the private rented sector, in order to
meet their legal obligations to house homeless households or households at risk
of homelessness.
This sets up the possibility that the lower costs due to lower housing-benefit
payments may indirectly just inflate the cost to councils to acquire capacity in the
private rented sector in order to meet the legal obligations, partly neutralizing the
fiscal savings that may have been generated due to lowering the LHA.
Results We simulate the full distribution of cost savings due to lower housing
benefit spending that we empirically can attribute to the cut in reference rents.
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Similarly, we simulate the full distribution of local council cost increases that we
can attribute to the cut in housing benefits. We obtain two empirical distributions
of point estimates and can compare these. We present the results graphically in
Figure 10. The results suggest that much of the savings due to lower costs in
housing benefit were immediately absorbed through higher council spending.
On average, across local authority districts, for every pound saved in lower
housing benefit, the costs to councils for homelessness prevention increased by
53 pence. The distribution is quite skewed: for the median council, the fiscal
savings due to lower housing benefit costs amount to a mere £12.92 per thousand
household. This is mostly offset with higher costs due to homelessness prevention
efforts, increasing local council costs by £9.86 per thousand households. For the
median district, the net fiscal savings amount £ 3.06 per thousand household.
Across the whole of the UK, the projected ex-ante fiscal savings from the cut
to local housing allowance were estimated to be around around £400 million. Our
estimates imply that the actual savings were closer to £542 million. This is offset
with an overall increase in spending on council anti homelessness measures of
£259 million, implying a dramatic shifting of burden from the central government
to local governments.
This is exacerbated by very strict limits to local governments to raise revenues
or to borrow, implying that many councils in turn, had to dramatically cut other
services in order to cover the increasing cost due to homelessness.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the effects of a policy: the reduction of reference
rents that underpin the housing benefit allowance in the UK, in the wake of the
Conservative-led austerity cuts. We show that the policy had high social and hu-
man costs, as it substantially increased evictions, individual insolvencies, tempo-
rary accommodation, statutory homelessness and rough sleeping. It is, in a sense,
a tale in the making, since the scale of the cut was severe (in the top quintile, at
least £500 per household per year) and hit a financially-vulnerable strata of the
population.
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We also show how the policy to a large extent gave to one pocket by taking from
another. More specifically, once the increase in local spending by local councils
is taken into account, we estimate the cost-saving elasticity to be approximately
47 per cent for each pound of housing benefit reduction. In other words, for
each pound saved, 53 cents were shifted onto temporary housing costs, which are
substantially more expensive than the permanent kind, and catered for at the local
level. For the median council, on aggregate the average savings per household
was a mere £3.06 per thousand households. On aggregate, the projected fiscal
savings were close to £542 million, and were substantially offset by an increase in
temporary housing expenditure by £259 million. This highlights the potential for
unintended policy consequences, with a social as well as economic consequences:
it has been shown.
Moreover, we document the effects that the policy had on representative demo-
cratic participation in the elections in the UK: in the most affected districts, elec-
toral registration rates dropped markedly. This finding is reproduced during the
2016 EU referendum vote, where we found evidence that the turnout is substan-
tially lower. We also find that the support for Leave was higher in those places,
which is possibly driven by a composition effect on the electorate since the pro-
clivity to vote Remain was substantially higher among those who did not turn out
to vote in that occasion.
This paper brings together a few strands of the literature concerning the causes
and consequences of household displacement, and the role that policymaking ex-
erts in preventing and mitigating insecure and precarious living conditions, being
homelessness and rough sleeping at the extreme of this distribution. This paper
also connects the effects of displacement effects onto the democratic representation
and social choices, specifically when the electoral registration process is designed
in such a way that it connected to the place of domicile; and particularly so when
a vulnerable strata of the population is less likely to be represented.
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Figure 1: Estimated impact of reducing Local Housing Allowance from covering median to 30th percentile of rents
at the district level for different types of properties
Panel A: One Bedroom flats Panel B: Two Bedroom flats Panel C: Three Bedroom flats
Notes: Figure plots the amount lost in pounds per week in housing benefit per household due to the reduction in the local housing allowance rate covering the 50th percentile
of private sector rents to only cover up to the 30th percentile of private sector rents. The figure highlights significant spatial variation of the incidence of the shock.
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Figure 2: Ex-ante estimated impact of change in housing benefit reference rent: moving from median to 30th per-
centile of rents as maximum allowable rent
Panel A: Households affected Panel B: Avg loss per affected household per year
Notes: Map plots out the exposure to the cut to local housing allowance across districts using data from the Department for Works and Pension’s Official Economic Impact
Assessment. Panel A presents data on the number of households affected expressed as a share of all resident households. Panel B presents the distribution of the average loss
per affected household at the district level.
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Figure 3: Variance decomposition of projected and residualized impact estimates relative to official impact estimates
across England
Panel A: Projected values S
predicted
d
sd(Sofficiald )
Panel B: Residual values S
residual
d
sd(Sofficiald )
Notes: Map plots out the exposure to the cut to local housing allowance across districts using data from the Department for Works and Pension’s Official Economic Impact
Assessment. Panel A presents data on the number of households affected expressed as a share of all resident households. Panel B presents the distribution of the average loss
per affected household at the district level.
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Figure 4: Impact of cuts in reference rents on housing benefit spending
Notes: Figure plot the results of the regression of the log of the housing benefit spending on the exposure measure from
studying the impact of the cut to local housing allowance to cover the median rent to only cover the 30th percentile of rents
from April 2011 onwards. All regressions control for local authority district fixed effects and year effects. 90% confidence
bands obtained from clustering standard errors at the district level are indicated.
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Figure 5: Impact of change in reference rent on forced evictions of people living in rental accommodation
Panel A: Possession orders Panel B: Actual repossessions
Panel C: Private sector evictions Panel D: Social rented sector evictions (placebo)
Notes: All dependent variables are measured as rates relative to the number of resident households in a district. Figure plots results from studying the impact of the cut to
local housing allowance to cover the median rent to only cover the 30th percentile of rents from April 2011 onwards. The dependent variable in Panel A measures all Landlord
possession claims raised. Panel B studies actual repossessions carried out by county court bailiffs. Panel C studies all private rented sector related eviction actions (including
claims being launched, eviction notices being issued and actual repossessions). Panel D contrasts all social rented sector related eviction actions as a placebo outcome. All
regressions control for local authority district fixed effects and year fixed effects. 90% confidence bands obtained from clustering standard errors at the district level are
indicated.
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Figure 6: Impact of change in reference rent on individual insolvency cases and bankruptcies
Panel A: All individual insolvency cases Panel B: Individual voluntary arrangements
Notes: All dependent variables are measured as rates relative to the number of resident households in a district. The dependent variable in Panel A measures all individual
new (not corporate) bankruptcy cases issued in a calendar year. Panel B focuses on all new so-called individual voluntary arrangements as an insolvency procedure that is
typically used to restructure consumer loans; rent arrears can be included by require the permission of the landlord, which typically prefer to use court action. All regressions
control for local authority district fixed effects and year fixed effects. 90% confidence bands obtained from clustering standard errors at the district level are indicated.
39
Figure 7: Impact of change in reference rent on rate of residence in temporary accommodation and statutory home-
lessness
Panel A: Temporary accommodation Panel B: Spending on hosting homeless in Hostels & BnB’s
Notes: Figure plots from the regression studying the impact of the cut to local housing allowance to cover the median rent to only cover the 30th percentile of rents from April
2011 onwards. All dependent variables are measured as rates relative to the number of resident households in a district. The dependent variable in Panel A measures the
number of residents in temporary accommodation. Panel B is the spending on hosting homeless in hostels and bread-and-breakfast. All regressions control for local authority
district fixed effects and year fixed effects. 90% confidence bands obtained from clustering standard errors at the district level are indicated.
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Figure 8: Impact of change in reference rent on measures of statutory homelessness
Panel A: Statutory homeless Panel B: Roughsleeping
Notes: Figure plots from the regression studying the impact of the cut to local housing allowance to cover the median rent to only cover the 30th percentile of rents from April
2011 onwards. All dependent variables are measured as rates relative to the number of resident households in a district. The dependent variable in Panel A measures the
number of statutory homeless individuals. Panel B is the street count of rough sleepers. All regressions control for local authority district fixed effects and year fixed effects.
90% confidence bands obtained from clustering standard errors at the district level are indicated.
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Figure 9: Impact of change in reference rent on measures of electoral registration rates - parliamentary electorate /
voting age population
Panel A: % parliamentary electorate/ voting age population Panel B: % local election electorate/ voting age population
Notes: Figure plots from the regression studying the impact of the cut to local housing allowance to cover the median rent to only cover the 30th percentile of rents from April
2011 onwards. The dependent variable in Panel A is the parliamentary electorate as a share of the voting age population. Panel B is the share of the local election electorate
with respect to the voting age population. All regressions control for local authority district fixed effects and year fixed effects. 90% confidence bands obtained from clustering
standard errors at the district level are indicated.
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Figure 10: Cost-benefit analysis: Implied fiscal savings to central government due
to lower housing benefit costs versus higher council spending for homelessness
Notes: Figure plots out the full empirical distribution of the projected fiscal savings per 1000 households in a district due
to lower housing benefit payments as a result of the median to 30th percentile shift on the horizontal axis. The vertical
axis displays the corresponding estimated impact on increased overall council spending on homelessness and homelessness
prevention per 1000 households in a district since the cuts were implemented.
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Table 1: Impact of change in reference rent on eviction measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
main difference-in-difference exgenous treatment matched
Panel A: Possession claims due to rent arrears
post × Official treatment measure 0.121*** 0.038** 0.121*** 0.148*** 0.143*
(0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.075)
post × Projected treatment 0.131***
(0.029)
post × Residualized treatment 0.071***
(0.017)
Mean of DV .546 .416 .517 .546 .617 .617 .661
Panel B: Actual repossessions
post × Official treatment measure 0.073*** 0.024** 0.059*** 0.072*** 0.083
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.061)
post × Projected treatment 0.072***
(0.022)
post × Residualized treatment 0.035***
(0.012)
Mean of DV .368 .297 .336 .368 .409 .409 .44
Panel C: All private rented-sector eviction actions
post × Official treatment measure 0.425*** 0.123** 0.377*** 0.525*** 0.509*
(0.073) (0.048) (0.060) (0.075) (0.281)
post × Projected treatment 0.465***
(0.108)
post × Residualized treatment 0.244***
(0.062)
Mean of DV 1.36 .999 1.25 1.36 1.55 1.55 1.69
Panel D: All social-rented rented-sector eviction actions
post × Official treatment measure -0.034 0.007 -0.022 -0.085* -0.213
(0.027) (0.034) (0.025) (0.047) (0.157)
post × Projected treatment -0.069***
(0.027)
post × Residualized treatment 0.035
(0.043)
Mean of DV 2.64 2.46 2.67 2.64 2.85 2.85 3.01
Local authority districts 366 333 366 366 306 306 88
Observations 3293 2997 2195 3293 2753 2753 792
Include data after 2013 X X X X X X
London included? X X X X X X
Cd,c,2010 trends X
Matched pair x Year FE X
Quintile Spredictedd x Year FE X
Notes: All regressions include district- and year fixed effects. All dependent variables are measured as rates relative to the
number of resident households in a district. The dependent variable in Panel A measures all Landlord possession claims
raised. Panel B studies actual repossessions carried out by county court bailiffs. Panel C studies all private rented sector related
eviction actions (including claims being launched, eviction notices being issued and actual repossessions). Panel D contrasts
all social rented sector related eviction actions as a placebo outcome. Standard errors are clustered at the Local Government
Authority District Level with standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Table 2: Impact of change in reference rent on bankruptcies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
main difference-in-difference exgenous treatment matched
Panel A: Total individual bankruptcies
post × Official treatment measure 0.155*** 0.119* 0.127*** 0.132*** -0.010
(0.037) (0.062) (0.045) (0.049) (0.119)
post × Projected treatment 0.140***
(0.042)
post × Residualized treatment 0.097*
(0.050)
Mean of DV 6.01 6.27 6.54 6.01 5.95 5.95 5.67
Panel B: Individual voluntary arrangements
post × Official treatment measure 0.097*** 0.159*** 0.041*** 0.011 0.111**
(0.019) (0.028) (0.015) (0.016) (0.054)
post × Projected treatment 0.061***
(0.022)
post × Residualized treatment 0.003
(0.012)
Mean of DV 2.62 2.73 2.63 2.62 2.59 2.59 2.56
Local authority districts 338 305 338 338 306 306 88
Observations 3041 2745 2027 3041 2753 2753 792
Include data after 2013 X X X X X X
London included? X X X X X X
Cd,c,2010 trends X
Matched pair x Year FE X
Quintile Spredictedd x Year FE X
Notes: All regressions include district- and year fixed effects. All dependent variables are measured as rates relative to the
number of resident households in a district. The dependent variable in Panel A measures all individual new (not corporate)
bankruptcy cases issued in a calendar year. Panel B focuses on all new so-called individual voluntary arrangements as an
insolvency procedure that is typically used to restructure consumer loans; rent arrears can be included by require the permission
of the landlord, which typically prefer to use court action. Standard errors are clustered at the Local Government Authority
District Level with standard errors presented in parentheses.
45
Table 3: Impact of change in reference rent on council spending on temporary housing and homeless prevention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
main difference-in-difference exgenous treatment matched
Panel A: Temporary accommodation
post × Official treatment measure 0.532*** 0.010 0.262* 1.152*** 1.364**
(0.177) (0.166) (0.153) (0.306) (0.576)
post × Projected treatment 0.698***
(0.238)
post × Residualized treatment 0.652**
(0.276)
Mean of DV 2.99 1.72 2.69 2.99 2.74 2.74 2.94
Panel B: Council spending on hostels and BnB’s
post × Official treatment measure 8.295*** 0.781 3.824*** 12.457*** 6.345**
(1.968) (0.524) (1.384) (2.119) (2.809)
post × Projected treatment 8.478***
(2.317)
post × Residualized treatment 4.851***
(1.668)
Mean of DV 9.83 4.11 7.58 9.83 11.5 11.5 13.9
Panel C: Total council spending on temporary housing
post × Official treatment measure 17.536*** 1.601 8.651*** 31.967*** 14.742***
(3.700) (1.151) (2.699) (4.699) (4.917)
post × Projected treatment 21.509***
(4.005)
post × Residualized treatment 19.791***
(4.658)
Mean of DV 18.2 5.15 14.6 18.2 21.6 21.6 25.2
Local authority districts 366 333 366 366 306 306 88
Observations 3243 2947 2195 3243 2752 2752 792
Include data after 2013 X X X X X X
London included? X X X X X X
Cd,c,2010 trends X
Matched pair x Year FE X
Quintile Spredictedd x Year FE X
Notes: All regressions include district- and year fixed effects. All dependent variables are measured as rates relative to the number
of resident households in a district. The dependent variable in Panel A measures the share of households housed in temporary
accommodation by councils to prevent homelessness. Panel B focuses on council spending on overnight bed- and breakfast and
hostel accommodation; Panel C focuses on total council spending for temporary accommodation. Standard errors are clustered at
the Local Government Authority District Level with standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Table 4: Impact of change in reference rent on homelessness and rough sleeping
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
main difference-in-difference exgenous treatment matched
Panel A: Statutory homelessness
post × Official treatment measure 0.563*** 0.336** 0.450*** 0.761*** 0.772**
(0.121) (0.162) (0.113) (0.173) (0.316)
post × Projected treatment 0.381***
(0.104)
post × Residualized treatment 0.330***
(0.124)
Mean of DV 4.27 4.17 4.39 4.27 2.56 2.56 2.94
Panel B: Rough sleeping street counts
post × Official treatment measure 3.310** 1.918** 0.847** 5.585** 3.065
(1.539) (0.877) (0.385) (2.644) (3.040)
post × Projected treatment 4.264**
(1.778)
post × Residualized treatment 4.079*
(2.408)
Mean of DV 8.56 7.23 6.79 8.56 8.42 8.42 8.66
Include data after 2013 X X X X X X
London included? X X X X X X
Cd,c,2010 trends X
Matched pair x Year FE X
Quintile Spredictedd x Year FE X
Notes: All regressions include district- and year fixed effects. The dependent variable in Panel A measures the share of
households that are classified as homeless and in priority need by councils. The dependent variable in Panel B is the total
number of rough sleepers estimated or physically verified through street counts by councils. Standard errors are clustered at
the Local Government Authority District Level with standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Table 5: Impact of cut to local housing allowance on electoral registration, turnout and sup-
port for Leave in the 2016 EU referendum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
main difference-in-difference exgenous treatment matched
Panel B: EU referendum electorate
Official treatment measure -0.992*** -0.757*** -0.992*** -1.916***
(0.309) (0.282) (0.309) (0.649)
Projected treatment -1.431***
(0.406)
Residualized treatment -1.090***
(0.400)
R2 .792 .685 .792 .827 .832 .813
Mean of DV 91.3 92.4 91.3 91.1 91.1 89.9
Observations 365 332 365 304 304 79
Panel B: Turnout
Official treatment measure -1.824*** -2.057*** -1.824*** -1.928***
(0.247) (0.281) (0.247) (0.517)
Projected treatment -1.871***
(0.500)
Residualized treatment -0.743**
(0.348)
R2 .746 .749 .746 .753 .805 .837
Mean of DV 73.8 74.2 73.8 74.3 74.3 74.5
Observations 365 332 365 304 304 79
Panel C: % support for Leave
Official treatment measure 2.191*** 1.784*** 2.191*** 1.261
(0.508) (0.496) (0.508) (1.251)
Projected treatment 2.773***
(0.537)
Residualized treatment 3.134***
(0.526)
R2 .774 .769 .774 .742 .777 .797
Mean of DV 53.2 54.6 53.2 54.5 54.5 53.4
Observations 365 332 365 304 304 79
NUTS2 FE X X X X X X
Immigration controls ? X X X X X X
London included? X X X X X
Cd,c,2010 X
Quintile Spredictedd X
Notes: All regressions include NUTS2 level shifters. The dependent variable in Panel A is the official electorate
in the 2016 EU referendum divided by the voting age population in 2016; in Panel B, the dependent variable
is official turnout relative to the official electorate in the EU referendum; the dependent variable in Panel C is
the % support for Leave among those that turned out. All regressions include also controls for the level and
changes in migration measured as the share or the change in the share of the resident population between 2001
and 2011 census relative to 2001 coming from EU member countries as of 2001, the newly joined Accession EU
member countries that the EU from 2004 onwards and from the rest of the world. Standard errors are clustered
at the Local Government Authority District Level with standard errors presented in parentheses.
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1
Figure A1: Broad Rental Market Areas across the United Kingdom
Notes: This figure presents the geographic shapes representing the UK’s Broad Rental Market Area’s at which level local
housing allowance rates are determined based on rental market surveys by the UK governments Valuation Office Agency.
This serves as key determinant of the value of housing benefits.
2
Figure A2: Private rental market development and home ownership in the UK
over time
Notes: This figure presents data from the Office of National Statistics measuring the share of households living in the
private rented sector versus the share of households living in owner occupied housing (owned outright or with mortgage).
3
Figure A3: Affordability and the impact of housing benefit across the market seg-
ments
Notes: This figure presents data from the Office of National Statistics measuring the share of households living in the
private rented sector versus the share of households living in owner occupied housing (owned outright or with mortgage).
4
Figure A4: Sample images of estate agents explicitly excluding benefit claimants
5
Figure A5: Impact of housing benefit cut on crime
Panel A: Theft from person homeless Panel B: Burglaries
Notes: All dependent variables are measured as rates relative to the number of resident households in a district. The dependent variable in Panel A measures the reported
cases of theft from individuals; Panel B focuses on burglaries. All regressions control for local authority and year fixed effects. 90% confidence bands obtained from clustering
standard errors at the district level are indicated.
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Table A1: Mean-squared prediction error of reference rents in March 2011
Model Shared 1 Bedroom 2 Bedrooms 3 Bedrooms 4 Bedrooms
Lag 1 36.89 177.48 649.02 1,934.47 837.85
Lag 6 10.16 88.42 307.70 909.56 354.64
Lag 1 and 6 36.06 220.22 801.37 2,433.36 2,019.63
FE 5.50 51.41 208.37 659.78 37,794.43
Lag 1 + FE 15.42 82.59 350.64 1,100.74 62,437.64
Lag 6 + FE 7.30 58.36 193.50 985.32 277.47
Lag 1 and 6 + FE 4.43 294.49 1,161.64 2,293.09 3,328.65
Linear trends 10.49 48.73 187.31 544.33 38,184.91
Lag 1 + Linear trends 18.63 136.15 554.68 1,746.28 29,149.53
Lag 6 + Linear Trends 65.70 381.08 1,274.73 4,287.36 2,633.92
Lag 1 and 6 + Linear Trends 9.34 270.75 1,136.40 3,884.34 2,596.28
Note: out-of-the-sample mean-square error (MSE) of the interquantile difference (50th to 30th
quantile) in reference rents in March 2011, with data between June 2010 and February 2011.
“Model” column contains the elements of the forecasting model that were used in the fore-
casting regression. The model with lowest MSE is highlighted in bold.
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Table A2: Impact of change in reference rent on housing benefit spending per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
main difference-in-difference exgenous treatment matched
Panel A: log(Housing benefit per capita)
post × Official treatment measure -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.014*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
post × Projected treatment -0.014***
(0.003)
post × Residualized treatment -0.009**
(0.004)
Mean of DV 6.6 6.52 6.57 6.6 6.58 6.58 6.62
Include data after 2013 X X X X X X
London included? X X X X X X
Cd,c,2010 trends X
Matched pair x Year FE X
Quintile Spredictedd x Year FE X
Notes: All regressions include district- and year fixed effects. The dependent variable in measures the log value of housing benefit
spending per household in a district and year. Standard errors are clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level with
standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Table A3: Impact of change in reference rent on crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
main difference-in-difference exgenous treatment matched
Panel A: Theft from person
post × Official treatment measure 0.975** 0.119 1.357** 2.083*** 0.447
(0.431) (0.146) (0.578) (0.513) (0.727)
post × Projected treatment 1.589***
(0.398)
post × Residualized treatment 1.663***
(0.303)
Mean of DV 4.17 2.66 4.24 4.17 4.41 4.41 3.94
Panel B: Burglaries
post × Official treatment measure 0.113 -0.227 0.267** 0.219 -0.709
(0.150) (0.272) (0.135) (0.262) (0.933)
post × Projected treatment 0.183
(0.148)
post × Residualized treatment 0.382**
(0.182)
Mean of DV 11.8 10.7 12.1 11.8 12.2 12.2 12.7
Panel C: Bodily harm
post × Official treatment measure 0.057 -0.150 -0.010 0.221 -0.210
(0.168) (0.314) (0.175) (0.222) (1.303)
post × Projected treatment 0.193
(0.135)
post × Residualized treatment 0.135
(0.202)
Mean of DV 19.6 18.7 19.5 19.6 19.6 19.6 18.6
Include data after 2013 X X X X X X
London included? X X X X X X
Cd,c,2010 trends X
Matched pair x Year FE X
Quintile Spredictedd x Year FE X
Notes: All regressions include district- and year fixed effects. All dependent variables are measured as rates relative to the
number of resident households in a district. The dependent variable in Panel A measures the reported cases of theft from
individuals; Panel B focuses on burglaries while Panel C studies cases of bodily harm. Standard errors are clustered at the
Local Government Authority District Level with standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Table A4: Impact of housing benefit cut on electoral registration coverage rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
main difference-in-difference exgenous treatment matched
Panel A: Parliamentary electors
post × Official treatment measure -0.004*** -0.003** -0.002** -0.004** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
post × Projected treatment -0.004***
(0.001)
post × Residualized treatment -0.002
(0.001)
Mean of DV .924 .936 .938 .924 .923 .923 .917
Panel B: Local government electors
post × Official treatment measure -0.004*** -0.003** -0.000 -0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
post × Projected treatment -0.003***
(0.001)
post × Residualized treatment -0.001
(0.002)
Mean of DV .948 .954 .961 .948 .949 .949 .943
Include data after 2013 X X X X X X
London included? X X X X X X
Cd,c,2010 trends X
Matched pair x Year FE X
Quintile Spredictedd x Year FE X
Notes: All regressions include district- and year fixed effects. The dependent variable in Panel A measures annually the share of
the registered voters eligible to vote in Westminster elections divided by the voting age population in a district and year. Panel
B focuses on local government electors as a share of the voting age population as a broader measure of the electorate. Standard
errors are clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level with standard errors presented in parentheses.
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